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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LaVAR F. REESE and DAVID
REESE, by and through his Guardian
Ad Litem, La Var F. Reese,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
GEORGE PROCTOR
and Appellant.

!'

I

C ase No.
12372

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries, property
damage and medical expenses arising out of a collision
between the minor plaintiff, David Reese, who at the
time was riding his bicycle, and George Proctor, who at
the time was driving his automobile. La Var Reese is
joined as the guardian ad litem of the minor plaintiff
and individually as the natural father of the minor plaintiff responsible for the medical expenses incurred.
1

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The case was tried by a jury who rendered a verdict
for and on behalf of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. Defendant appeals from the verdict and judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks reversal of the judgment
against him and a new trial.

STATEMENTS OF FACTS
Respondents (hereinafter referred to as "plaintiffs" or "David") agree with appellant's Statement of
Facts only insofar as the date, place and time of the accident; the weather conditions; the speed of appellant's
vehicle; and the speed limit in the area where the accident occurred. Many of the remaining statements by appellant choose facts most favorable to his contentions
and ignore other facts which were established by the evidence and support the instruction which the appellant
now elleges was given in error.
The evidence established that appellant (hereinafter referred to as ".Mr. Proctor") was proceeding west
on 7000 South. At the same time David Reese was proceeding north along De Ville Drive on his bicycle. There
is a drain gutter at the point where the two streets intersect (Ex. 1-P).
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Mr. Proctor saw David enter 7000 South as David
passed over the drain gutter (R. 191-92; Ex. 1-P). At
this time David was traveling at a speed of five miles per
hour (R. 224). At the time Mr. Proctor saw David enter
7000 South, the Proctor vehicle was traveling at a speed
of 35 miles per hour (R. 200; 354).
Mr. Proctor testified that after seeing David, he
looked behind him to see if it was safe to suddenly apply
his brakes (R. 195), but admitted that he would have
applied his brakes regardless of the traffic behind him
(R. 19.5). After finally applying the brakes, Proctor's
front wheels skidded about 31 feet before impact (R.
173-7 4) and about 33 feet after impact (R. 17 4).
There was no dispute in the evidence over Mr.
Prodor's speed of 35 miles per hour. There were two
estimates of David's speed. One estimate was received
going 10 to
from l\fr. Proctor who stated that David
::lO miles per hour when he first observed him (R. 194).
The other estimate was given by Gary Bywater, an eye
witness to the accident. 1\1.:r. Bywater estimated David's
speed at five miles per hour (R. 224; 228). Mr. Bywater
was a bicycle enthusiast and had had considerable experience in estimating bicycle speeds (R. 224-25).
There was circumstantial evidence offered to assist
the jury in choosing between the two estimates. There
was a deep depression in the road at the point of the
drain gutter (R. 371; Ex. 20-P; 21-P; 19-P; 26-D)
that made passage over that point at ten miles an hour
vtry uncomfortable in that the rider would be thrown
3

off the seat of the bike ( R. 371-7 4; 328) . Mr. Proctor
did not observe David bounce off the seat of the bike as
he passed over the drain gutter (R. 198-99) which casts
some doubt as to Proctor's estimate. The depression was
16o/s inches below the crown of 7000 South (R. 371).
David's physical limitations (R. 264; 270; 235-36)
and the distance over which he had available to accelerate
( R. 37 4) indicated a slower speed.
Certainly the jury could reasonably accept Bywater' s estimate over the estimate of George Proctor
since Bywater' s judgment was based on considerable
experience, was unbiased and was corroborated by other
evidence.
The evidence established that David's speed was
constant as he traveled from the drain gutter to the point
of impact ( R. 195) ; he was still going five miles an hour
at the time of the impact ( R. 228) .
Since there was no dispute as to Proctor's speed, the
point of impact, the location of David at the time Proctor
first saw him and since there was probative evidence as
to David's speed, Officer D. Throckmorton was called as
an expert witness to testify as to the location of .Mr.
Proctor when he first saw David enter 7000 South.
The evidence established that at five miles per hour
it took David 5.75 seconds to travel from the drain gutter
(where Proctor first saw him) to the impact point (R
356). Applying this time to Mr. Proctor at his known
speed of 35 miles per hour, it was established that Proc-
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tor was 289 feet away from the impact point when he
first saw David enter the intersection (R. 356; 360) .
At the speed .Mr. Proctor was traveling when he
first observed David enter the intersection his car would
move 38 feet during his normal reaction time (R. 364).
Measuring this distance from the beginning of the skidmarks, Proctor's first reaction to David's presence occurred when Proctor was 68 feet from the point of impact (R. 364-68 ; Ex. 1-P) . In other words, Mr. Proctor
traveled 221 feet during a period of 4.3 seconds after seeing David until he first reacted or took any evasive action ( R. 368-69) . During this entire period both parties
were moving closer to the point of impact. David's approximate position with the passage of each second of
time beginning from the time when he left the drain
gutter is shown on Exhibit 1-P (R. 375-76).
\\Then Proctor first saw David, Proctor was 289
feet away from the point of impact and David was 42
feet away from the same point (Ex. 1-P; R. 356). One
and three-fourths seconds later, David had proceeded 14
feet onto 7000 South and Proctor was 199 feet from the
impact point and had not reacted to David's presence
(Ex. 1-P; R. 377). Two and three-fourths seconds after
seeing David and his bicycle, David had ridden 20 feet
onto 7000 South (Ex. 1-P) and Proctor was 148 feet
away from the impact point and still had not reacted (R.
377; Ex. 1-P). Three and three-fourths seconds after
seeing David on his bicycle, David had traveled 30 feet
onto 7000 South and was only 14.7 feet from impact
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(Ex. 1-P) and Proctor was then 96 feet from the impact
point and had still not reacted ( R. 377; Ex. 1-P).
David did not see the Proctor vehicle until just before it hit him (R. 401; 201; 214; 219; 277). Mr. Proctor
was aware that David had not seen the danger ( R. 201).
Mr. Proctor testified that David did not see the car until
a fractional second before impact (R. 201). This comports with David's testimony at the time of trial and his
statements at the scene (R. 401; 214; 219; 277).
At the time Mr. Proctor first saw David, he realized
that David was a child (R. 196). As justification for his
failure to act immediately, Proctor testified that he
thought David was going to turn west into the on-coming
lanes (R. 196-97). However, Proctor admitted that this
merely an assumption based solely on the fact that he
did not believe David would ride out in front of the car
(R. 196). Aside from the fact that such a turn by David
would have been into the on-coming lanes of traffic and,
therefore illegal, there were other facts upon which the
jury could have found that Mr. Proctor did not really
assume David was going to turn. David gave no indication of such a turn ( R. 196) , he was pedaling rapidly
indicating a continued forward course (R. 192), it was
apparent that he was a child (R. 196) and the turn
would have been sharp and difficult to negotiate (Ex.
1-P) . Proctor did not sound his horn or give other
warning (R. 202-03) to prompt David to make an evasive turn.
David was mentally retarded by reason of a birth
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injury (R. 262-63). At the time of the accident he had
a chronological age of 15 years (R. 248-49), but his
school teacher testified that he had the mental ability of
an eight year old ( R. 268). David had received instruction on traffic safety, but it was difficult for him to apply
rules of conduct into actual fact situations (R. 269;
273).

ARGUMENT
THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 32 ON
LAST CLEAR CHANCE WAS SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
Mr. Proctor's only claim of error is that the Court
should not have given Instruction No. 32 on last clear
chance (ll. 120) because said instruction was not supported by the evidence. There is no claim by lVIr. Proctor that the substance of the instruction is incorrect.
A brief review of the evidence establishes that there
was substantial evidence supporting each and every component of the last clear chance instruction.
The first element of last clear chance is that David
Reese was in a position of danger (R. 120). There was
no serious contention that this element did not exist.
David was riding his bicycle on a collision course with
the Proctor vehicle. He was pedaling rapidly which indicated he intended to continue his course, he gave no
indication whatsoever that he intended on changing his
course , and Proctor knew that David was inattentive and
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that he was a child. All of these factors would certainly
justify a jury in concluding that David was in a position
of peril at the time he was observed by Mr. Proctor.
The second element is that David be totally unaware
of the danger by reason of inattention or lack of proper
alertness ( R. 120). The evidence clearly established this
element. David testified that he did not see the car until
moments before it hit him (R. 401). At the scene he told
his father that he did not look both ways (R. 214; 219).
He also told his mother that he did not see the car until
just before it hit him (R. 277-78). Mr. Proctor verified
that David did not see his car until just before impact
(R. 201).
The third element is that _Mr. Proctor must actually
see David and realize his peril (R. 120). This element
was also proven. Mr. Proctor said he saw David entering
7000 South as he passed over the drain gutter (R. 19192). Although he stated that he assumed David would
turn, there was evidence from which a jury could have
disbelieved this testimony. For example, l\ilr. Proctor
estimated that David was going 10 to 20 miles an hour
( R. 194) . If this was his actual estimate of speed, it is
difficult to believe that he thought David would or even
could turn at such a sharp angle at this speed. David was
pedaling rapidly which suggests no change of his course.
Moreover, the turn would have been into the on-coming
lanes of traffic and would involve a very sharp and un·
usual turn. Certainly the evidence justified a finding
that Proctor saw and realized the danger.
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The mere fact that Proctor assumed David would
turn does not preclude a finding that he did not realize
David was in danger, it merely shows that he realized the
danger but "assumed" it might be removed.
The fourth element is that George Proctor realize
or should have realized that David was unaware of the
peril ( R. 120) . In this regard, note the testimony of
George Proctor:
Q. Based upon your observation of David over
the distance that he traveled, do you have any
judgment as to whether he saw you prior to the
impact?

A. David did not see me until just prior to the
impact when he turned his face, and I saw him
face to face.
Q. And that was at the moment of impact?

A. Just prior to the moment of impact.
Q. A fractional second before impact?
A. I would say just a fractional second. (R.
201).
The fifth and sixth elements are that Proctor had
clear opportunity to avoid the accident by the use of ordinary care after realizing the danger and negligently
failing to take evasive action ( R. 120). In this regard,
the evidence established that Proctor saw David when he
was crossing the drain gutter. At that moment David
was 42.5 feet away from the point of impact (Ex. 1-P).
He continued to observe David during the following
5.75 seconds as David rode to the impact point (R. 1929

94). At the time he first observed David, Proctor was
289 feet from the point of impact ( R. 356) . At any time
prior to the collision he was capable of reacting and
stopping his vehicle in 101 feet (Ex. 1-P; R. 172, 364).
Thus, after seeing the danger, George Proctor took no
action for 4.3 seconds (R. 368). During that 4.3 seconds
he could have avoided the collision by applying his
brakes, turning his automobile or perhaps even sounding
his horn.
It is apparent that there is ample evidence in the
record to support the giving of Instruction No. 32. If
last clear chance was the basis of a verdict for plaintiffs,
it was a reasonable finding.

Counsel for Mr. Proctor cites Donohue v. Rolando,
16 U.2d 294, 400 P.2d 12 ( 1965), for the proposition
that if David's negligence continued up to the moment of
injury, then Proctor must have actual knowledge of
David's peril. There is ample evidence from which the
jury could find that Proctor was actually aware of
David's peril. Proctor admitted that he saw David enter
the intersection and observed that David was headed into
his course of travel, he knew David was a child, he knew
David was unaware of his approach and presence, and
he could see that David was apparently intending to continue straight across by reason of the fact that he was
pedaling rapidly and gave no indication whatsoever that
he intended to turn. Such evidence supports the submission of last clear chance under the Donohue decision.
In the course of the Donohue opinion, the Court
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noted that facts necessary to support the doctrine of last
clear chance differed depending on whether the plaintiff
is in extricable as opposed to inextricable peril. Counsel
for Mr. Proctor seizes upon this language to assert the
erroneous proposition that if David could possibly have
turned his bicycle and avoided the accident, then the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply. The Court in
the Donohue case made no such ruling. The Court merely stated that if the plaintiff could have turned to avoid
the accident, the driver must have actual knowledge of
the peril before the doctrine will apply. The jury could
have reasonably found that Proctor had such knowledge
in this case.
Since the bicycle rider in the Donohue case suddenly changed his course of travel in front of the car moments before impact, the Court in that case held that the
driver did not realize the peril until it was too late to
avoid the accident and thus last clear chance did not
apply. The distinction between Donohue and the instant
case is apparent. '¥"hereas the bicyclist in Donohue suddenly turned in front of the car, the bicyclist in the instant case was headed on a collision course with the car
from the moment Proctor first saw him at the drain
gutter to the time of the collision.
The Idaho case of Laidlaw v. Barker, 78 Idaho 67,
297 P.2d 287 ( 1956), is cited by Proctor in support of
the contention that last clear chance is inapplicable. A
quotation of the basis of the Laidlaw decision illustrates
its inapplicability to the situation at hand:
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... Only six-tenths to seven-tenths of a seeon<l
mathematically ealculatcd, elapsed from the
the ... boy's peril Lemme apparent to appellant
llarker before the accident; under the eireumstances appellants did not have a last clear chance
to avoid the accident.
The six-tenths of one second available to the defendant in the Laidlaw case and the 5.75 seconds available to
.Mr. Proctor in the instant case takes away any basis of
comparison between the two cases.
Counsel argues that l\'Ir. Proctor was not expected
to realize the danger until David was out in front of him
or near the middle of the road; that David's presence
should be ignored while he crossed over the east bound
lane. No case is cited in support of this proposition. Nu
court has ever held that an adult driver seeing a child
pursuing a collision course with a car may withhold evasive action on the assumption that the child "might" turn
his bicycle or take other evasive action. On the contrary,
the precise reason for the doctrine is to force drivers who
have observed the negligence or inattentiveness of another to take evasiYe or preventative measures. If such
drivers may withhold until a collision is imminent, the
purpose behind the doctrine is frustrated. A contention
that the danger must be imminent was raised in the case
of Graham v. J uhnson, 109 l.Jtah 365, 172 P.2d 66.1
(1946):
Defendants
The plaintiff or the person desiring to invoke the doctrine of last clear
must be in a position of imminent peril. That is
not the best statement of what defendants mean.
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IS

n.

It may defeat itself. If the peril is too imminent,
there may be no clear chance to avoid the accident.

In further search of supporting authority, counsel
for Mr. Proctor cites Berton v. Cochran, 81 Cal. App.2d
776, 185 P.2d 349 (1947). A mere quotation of the basis
of the holding of the case illustrates its inapplicability to
the situation at hand:
In the view most favorable to defendant relative
to the doctrine of last clear chance, the defendant
traveled 15 feet after he first saw the boy and before the collision, and if defendant traveled at the
rate of 37 feet a second the collision occurred less
than a second after defendant first saw the boy
The fractional second in the Berton case is of no
assistance in deciding the applicability of last clear
chance in a case where the driver had 5.75 seconds after
first observing the boy.
Counsel for Mr. Proctor further cites Hickok v.
Skinner, 113Utah1, 190 P.2d 514 (1948). This involved
an intersection collision between two cars. The plaintiff
saw the defendant about 400 to 500 feet away from the
intersection going about 45 miles an hour. Plaintiff then
entered the intersection at a slow speed, and subsequently was involved in a broadside collision with the def endant.
The Court noted that the plaintiff saw the defendant prior to the collision and was therefore not in a position to claim that the defendant had the last clear
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chance. On the basis of the plaintiff's observation, the
Court held that both had an opportunity to avoid the
accident and neither could shift the fault to the other.
Since David did not see .:\Ir. Proctor prior to the
impact, the two cases are not comparable. There is no
speculation as to which had the last clear chance in the
instant case since one party was aware of the situation at
all times whereas the other party was totally and completely unaware and the inattentiveness of the one party
was known to the other.
The Court also noted in the II i<.:kok case that it
not unusual for a motor vehicle to enter an intersection
and stop near the center line to wait for other traffic to
pass. Thus, the entry into the intersection did not put
the defendant in that case on notice of the peril. However, Proctor offered no such evidence in the instant case
that it is customary for a child to enter an intersection
and move to the center line to wait for cars to pass. Moreover, the action of David in pedaling rapidly and not
looking east or west as he entered the intersection would
not justify the belief on Proctor's part that David was
going to the center of the road to wait for westbound
traffic to pass.
Unable to find any support for his contentions
among the decisions of this Court, Proctor turns to the
Oregon case of Niday vs. Tomasini, 240 Ore. 589, 403
P.2d 704 ( 196.5), and asks this Court to depart from its
past decisions and adopt the rule of that case.
Proctor characterizes the case as holding that the
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doctrine of last clear chance is never applied so long as
the plaintiff could have physically escaped from the
peril.
The holding of the Niday case is unclear. No facts
are stated at any point in the opinion. However, it appears from the wording of the case that the only chance
that the defendant had to avoid the accident was turning
his vehicle from one side to the other:
Under the facts of this case, it would be impossible for the defendant to know what move the
plaintiff was going to make to extricate himself
from the position in which his own negligence had
placed him. The plaintiff might have swerved to
his right and the defendant to his left and a collision would have occurred; or if the plaintiff
swerved to his left and the defendant also swerved
to his left, the collision would have occurred.
If turning the vehicle was the only evasive action
available, the case is not comparable since Proctor had
ample opportunity to stop. Moreover, if turning the car
was all that defendant could do, the holding of the case
is that the defendant no longer had a chance to avoid
the accident.

Assuming for the
of argument that Proctor
correctly sta
''ihk.
'of last clear chance is
inapplicable whenever the plaintiff is in extricable peril,
the case should not be followed.

t

In the first place, it is not in accord with recent authority of this Court, Morby v. Rodgers, 122 Utah 540,
252 P.2d 231 (1953); Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah
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365, 172 PP.2d 665 (194()); Donohue v. Rolando, Hi

Utah 2d 294, 400 P.2d 12, or the overwhelming weight
of authority from other jurisdictions, Restatement,
Torts §§ 479, 480. This Court has always held that the
doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in cases of extricable peril. Ibid.
Secondly, the holding is contrary to reason. It says
that one may proceed down the street and observe a person in danger and inflict injuries without liability so
long as the other person could have physically gotten out
of the way. The fact that the injured person did not see
the vehicle was of no concern to the court-he is expected
to escape anyway. Under the holding of the case, the
fact that the driver saw the injured person in plenty of
time to avoid the collision is outweighed Ly the fact that
the unknowing victim did not get out of the way.
Thirdly, the public policy effect of such a holding
is catastrophic. The law would say that a driYer may
withhold evasive action with impunity so long as the person he is about to hit can escape. The protection from
liability continues up to the time of the impact if the
victim's chance to escape lasts as long or longer than the
driver's chance to avoid the accident. In other words,
there is no responsibility to avoid an accident so long as
the other party can avoid it. The inadvisability of such a
ruling is obvious.
Finally, the case is self-contradictory. The court
holds that the doctrine of last clear chance is nothing
more than an extension of the doctrine of proximate
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cause. After making such a holding, the court ignores
the universal rule that the negligence of one who sees and
appreciates a dangerous situation and takes no evasive
action is the superceding cause of the resulting injury,
Mc11'Iurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P.2d 711
(1959); Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d
693, 263 P.2d 287 ( 1953).
Proctor quotes language from the case of VanW agoner v. Union Pacific R. Co., 112 Utah 189, 186
P.2d 293 ( 1947) , for the proposition that he was entitled to assume that David was attentive. Taken in context, the Court stated only that a defendant may make
this assumption until he has knowledge of facts which
indicate otherwise. In the instant case, Proctor testified
that he was actually aware that David was inattentive
(R. 201). Certainly he cannot assume David was attentive when he actually knew otherwise.
Turning to the Utah cases which are factually comparable, it is apparent that the doctrine was properly applied in the instant case. The case of Morby v. Rodgers,
122 Utah 540, 252 P.2d 231 (1953), is closely in point.
In that case the defendant was proceeding north in an
automobile and came upon a child who was traveling in
the same direction on a bicycle. While attempting to
pass, plaintiff collided with the bicycle. The Court upheld the instruction on last clear chance. The basis of the
fin ding was the mathematical positions of each party
prior to accident. After noting the fact that the young
boy involved had started to turn in front of the car when
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the automobile was 78 feet from the point of impact, the
Court held:
. . . During his reaetion time he would travel
the brakes were applied; after application, lus brakes would have stopped the car in
21 feet, making a total stopping distance of 43
feet. Thus, if he had employed the most obvious
and usual safety measure, he would have stopped
35 feet short of striking the boy.
A comparison of the facts of the instant case with
those just quoted supports the giving of Instruction No.
32 on last clear chance. Proctor noticed David's movement in front of his car when he was 289 feet from the
point of impact ( R. 356) . Proctor was traveling 35 miles
per hour (R. 200; 354). At that speed he traveled 38
feet before his brakes were applied (R. 366) ; after application his brakes would have stopped the car in 63
feet (R. 172; Ex. 1-P), making a total stopping distance
of 101 feet (R. 172; Ex. 1-P). Thus, if he had employed
the most obvious and usual safety measure, he would
have stopped 188 feet short of striking the boy, a much
greater distance than in the Morby case.
The Court in the Morby case noted that the defend·
ant saw the boy 300 feet prior to impact, but that the
boy started to turn into the car's course of travel only 78
feet prior to impact. In the instant case, the boy was pro·
ceeding into the car's course of travel when the driver
first observed the boy, thus his duty to react began at
the moment of his first observation rather than at a later
point in time as in the M orby case.
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Apart from the delay of 4.3 seconds in applying his
brakes, the cases would uphold the giving of an instruction on last clear chance by reason of the failure of Proctor to give any warning of his approach. Since he was
aware of David's inattentiveness, he could have avoided
the accident by sounding a warning. Graham v. Johnson,
109 Utah 346, 166 P.2d 230 ( 1946), rehearing, 109
Utah 365, 172 P.2d 665 (1946); Morby v. Rodgers, 122
Utah 540, 252 P.2d 231 ( 1953). Proctor never sounded
his horn ( R. 202-03) .
The main thrust of Proctor's argument is that
there was no duty to act when Proctor first saw David;
he was entitled to an "assumption," that David "might"
turn from his collision course with the car. Whatever
rationale is used in an attempt to explain the 4.3 seconds
of inaction, the basic fact remains that at the moment of
the first observation Proctor knew an inattentive child
was propelling a bicycle into his path. If Proctor is going
to cut off part of his period of inaction by claiming this
was not yet a dangerous situation, the doctrine of last
clear chance will lose its effectiveness. If there is no duty
to act until the danger is immenent, then by the time the
duty to act arises, it will be too late to act. This notion of
waiting for danger rather than anticipating it has particular significance when youngsters are involved. The
rule that adults must anticipate the propensities of
youngsters, Herald v. Smith, 56 Utah 304, 190 Pac.
932 ( 1920) , has no meaning if the adult may wait to act
until the danger is imminent.
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In the final analysis the test to be applied in deciding whether the doctrine of last clear chance was properly submitted to the jury is as follows:
The last clear chance duty is to do what a prudent
person would have done to avoid the accident had
he had the opportunity, whatever that would be
after he did or should have appreciated the other<
peril or approaching peril. Graham v. Johnson,
109 Utah 365, 172 P.2d 665, 668 ( 1946).
Applying this test, there was certainly a reasonable basis
to conclude that the peril was apparent when Proctor
first saw an inattentive child pass through a stop sign
rapidly pedaling his bicycle into his path; that at the moment of the first observation was the time to act; that it
was unreasonable to withhold action during the time the
two parties came closer to the impact point on the "assumption" that the boy "might" turn.
In his brief, Proctor asserts that he had only 2.75
seconds in which to avoid the accident. No reference is
made to the record as to how he arrives at this figure. No
testimony is cited or quoted stating any fact which supports this figure of 2.75 seconds. Even if the figure were
supported by the evidence, Proctor has cited no case
where such a period of time is held to be insufficient as
a matter of law.
All of Proctor's contentions on this appeal are more
in the nature of factual determinations which should be
decided by the jury in accordance with the instruction
and not matters which should be decided before the in·
struction is given.
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The question of when the peril arose, when Proctor
should have realized the peril, and whether Proctor had
a clear chance after realizing the peril are all elements of
the instruction itself to be decided by the jury. If the
court must decide all of these issues before it can give
the instruction there is no need to have it decided again
by the jury.
Under the evidence a jury could reasonably find
Proctor had the last clear chance. That is the only legal
issue. The argument about when he should have realized
the peril and other similar questions are factual matters
and should not be submitted to this Court to decide
agam.
CONCLUSION
All of the elements of last clear chance were clearly
established during the course of the trial. On the bases
of these established facts the jury could have reasonably
and logically found that George Proctor had the last
clear chance to avoid striking David Reese. Thus, the
rerdict of the jury and the judgment of the court
should be upheld.
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